Hawkins on intelligence: Fascination and frustration JeffHawkinsSandraBlakesleeOn Intelligence2004Times Books  by Perlis, Donald
Artificial Intelligence 169 (2005) 184–191
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Book review




University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA
Available online 21 October 2005
1. Introduction
I find On Intelligence to be both fascinating and frustrating. Fascinating in that it hints at
a potentially unifying view (the memory-prediction model) of brain structure and function;
and frustrating in that it is very sketchy and in that it also makes claims about AI and con-
scious experience that seem to me to be questionable. I will mostly leave the neural aspects
to other reviewers, focusing my remarks primarily on four things: (i) general comments
about the model and how it relates to AI, (ii) Deep Blue as case study, (iii) the Turing Test
and its impact on AI, and (iv) consciousness.
But first some general comments on the book, to orient the reader. Jeff Hawkins (with
co-author Sandra Blakeslee) has written an easy-to-read book on a topic of broad gen-
eral interest—the nature of intelligence and how it is that brains have it and why ma-
chines don’t yet—in which his own excitement comes through and infects the reader as
well. The account is largely biographical, in which Hawkins (inventor of the Palm Pi-
lot) describes how he came to his current ideas about artificial intelligence, the brain, and
related topics including Deep Blue, the Turing Test and the Chinese Room. He also de-
scribes the ideas themselves in an engaging way, and ends the whole thing with eleven
in-principle testable theses that his theory suggests. The upshot is that he thinks the
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the entire approach to building smart machines, and may make the latter possible within a
few years.
It’s a fun read, whether or not one thinks his ideas are new or correct. Yet it also may
cause ire in some readers who may feel that Hawkins has misrepresented research trends in
AI, especially in regard to the importance of the detailed nature of inner processing, and to
the particular importance of perception, memory and prediction as key parts of that inner
processing.
2. The memory-prediction model and AI
Hawkins’ basic premise seems right: perceptual-memory-based predictions surely do
play a fundamental role in intelligence and hence in brain structure and function. What does
this mean? That an intelligent agent learns from experience, and in particular builds up a
model of the world by perception (not only of what is out there but of what actions achieve
what results); and that this experience is remembered and available virtually instantly for
use in deciding what to expect next.
You might be thinking, “Ok, fine, who would disagree? This sounds like the mainstream
AI view: perceive-learn-store-recall-infer-plan-act, the long-envisioned hybridization of
various AI subspecialties into a single general-purpose intelligent agent, what we are all
working toward”. No, according to Hawkins: what is missing from mainstream AI is an ap-
preciation for the special functional architecture of the brain; special in that it is designed
(has evolved) with this hybridization, and especially for what he calls prediction: estimat-
ing what the agent would normally perceive next, given what it has perceived previously.
Just what makes him think AI is so far from the mark on this is not made totally clear
in the book, but it is true that we still seem to be far from the goal of anything remotely
approximating the general-purpose flexibility of human-level intelligence, and he thinks
that a more brain-informed approach that focuses on prediction will move things ahead
quickly.
Yet while we are not there yet, I would argue that we are moving in that direction, and
have been for some time. In particular, we are putting more and more perceptive/predictive
memory/world-modeling aspects into machines. It is nice to have someone of Hawkins’
prestige sounding the call for this kind of work, but simply stating it in a book does not
really solve any problems. The devil is in the details, and it is not clear that Hawkins has
anything to offer beyond what is already being done.
Thus many have studied predictive aspects of mind, in AI (e.g., the frame prob-
lem, the ramification problem, non-monotonic reasoning), in developmental and cog-
nitive psychology (e.g., the appearance-reality distinction, metacognition), in neuro-
science (e.g., efference copy). But his idea that prediction is the organizing feature
that underpins everything neocortical (and hence everything cognitive?) is striking in-
deed. Nevertheless, the various bodies of work from several disciplines just mentioned
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mind.1
3. Deep Blue as case study
Hawkins cites Deep Blue as an example of AI gone wrong, in the sense of doing a
narrow task extremely well (playing chess) but totally missing the boat with regard to
flexible intelligence or understanding. Deep Blue has the right I/O, it produces the right
chess moves in response to its opponent’s moves, but it knows not what it does.
Hawkins says (page 20): “understanding cannot be measured by external behavior”, but
he then follows this (page 21) with “The only way we can judge whether a computer is
intelligent is by its output, or behavior”. The first of these quotes I doubt many (any?)
AIers would disagree with.2 However, the second statement seems outright bizarre. With
computers—as opposed to humans—we can look inside to see the processing. In the case
of humans we can only guess, since (so far at least) we are not able to see into another’s
thoughts, nor very far into the details of their brain processes. Indeed, Hawkins takes a
look inside Deep Blue, in order to conclude that it does massive speedy blind look-aheads
of millions of options and does not (like a human expert) decide on a certain small number
of important ones to examine. We can all agree Deep Blue is not intelligent, does not
have understanding, not because we cannot look inside but precisely because we do know
what goes on inside it. Hawkins argues that, in principle, we might be able to program a
computer to do what a human (or a human brain) does, but he says no one is doing this and
no one can do this until we first know what the brain is doing.
Hawkins also cites the Chinese Room of Searle [8] as example of a program with no
understanding (page 20). Of course, as Hawkins is well aware, the “room” is a thought
experiment (no code exists, since it is an argument intended to apply to all programs).
Yet Hawkins also says that he thinks that the problem with the room-‘program’ is that it
really has no understanding because it fails to have the right inner processing: it is missing
the right sort of remembering of its experiences and using them for predicting. But this
is to miss the point of Searle’s claim: that no matter what kind of information-processing
a computer (program) does, it will only (at best) provide a simulation of a human (or the
brain) and will necessarily leave out anything that can sensibly be called intelligence or
1 I can hear Hawkins (perhaps along with some other readers) groaning, “Surely you can’t be serious that
the mentioned efforts in AI, and especially the research in nonmonotonic reasoning—that painstakingly formal
work—is bringing us closer to real, flexible, intelligent agents, dynamically updating their view of the world”?
Well, to some extent I sympathize with this, namely to the extent that I am trying to nudge that area (at least by
example of my own work) in more realistic directions, such as including real-time aspects, memory aspects, and
so on. But I think there is broad agreement that this is needed, and less consensus as to how. Whether features of
the neocortical neural substrate, e.g., its six-layered architecture, has anything to offer AI, is unclear, although
Hawkins obviously thinks it does, and I think few would insist that it does not.
2 Except in a prima facie sense; see below on the Turing Test for more on this. Note, after all, that teachers
routinely judge understanding by giving their students tests that measure I/O, not internal processing. But the
assumption is that there is very special internal processing going on behind the scenes, in the students’ brains.
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really agree with Searle’s argument.
But we can all agree on Deep Blue: it is brittle. It cannot play checkers, nor can it
learn to do so. This sort of observation applies as well to most AI programs today, as has
often been noted. And it is the basis for much ongoing work, to remedy the situation. It is,
for instance, the basis for the metacognitive loop (MCL) proposal being explored by my
own group at the University of Maryland [1,5]. Key to MCL is the idea of an expectation:
what the system thinks likely to happen next, so that it can decide whether an anomaly has
occurred, requiring special attention.
Expectations are of course based on the system’s current world model, which itself is
built out of experience in a very broad sense: perceptions but also inferences and other
inputs to its KB. For instance, perception may reveal that some rough-surfaced objects on
some rough-surfaced tables travel with the table when the latter is moved, and that some
other smooth-surfaced objects on some smooth-surfaced tables tend to slide off the table.
Now we are told that an object that we cannot see is smooth-surfaced and the table is also
smooth; what do we predict? Inference is required here, not simply memory. We need to
connect the symbolic information that the object is smooth with the remembered look of
past objects and the remembered slippage of those.3
How might this help Deep Blue? Well, it should notice that the game is different from
expectation, and initiate a learning process for the new game. Of course, Deep Blue cannot
do this, but endowed with a suitable version of MCL, it should be able to do so (this is the
sort of thing we are investigating).
So, Hawkins seems wrong about AI-blindness to internal (cognitive) workings (as in
world-model-based predictiveness) vs I/O behaviorism. How about his other claim, that the
specific neural architecture that the brain uses for this modeling is critical to intelligence?
That remains to be seen, but I know of no one in AI who thinks we should deliberately
ignore findings in neuroscience. The brain is the only example we have of an intelligent
system, and we would be foolish indeed to ignore it.
Hawkins bases much of his complaint about AI (that what is missing is an appreciation
for the internal processing—whether at the neural level, or simply at the cognitive level—
that constitutes intelligence, beyond mere externally observable I/O behaviors) on Alan
Turing, and his Turing Test, to which we turn next.
3 One can make much the same point about, for instance, planning: in unfamiliar settings, planning is not a
routine matter of recalling and applying a remembered sequence of past actions. Rather it requires fitting together
a new sequence, out of parts that must be sorted and sifted from a large pool, and arranged in ways suited to the
new setting. Yes, memory and prediction are very much involved, but in a way that amounts to heuristic search
and inference; and nothing in Hawkins’ model suggests new insights into how to do that. Even a trial and error
approach (aka generate-and-test) requires mechanisms that lie beyond mere memory and prediction. Of course,
to the extent that all information processing involves manipulating stored data (and hence, in a sense, memories)
then all cognition is memory-processing; but this is a truism, so general as to be unhelpful in understanding any
particular kind of processing.
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Did Alan Turing—the father of computer science—get us off on the wrong foot in the
famous Turing Test for intelligence?
Turing begins [12]:
I propose to consider the question, “Can machines think?” This should begin with de-
finitions of the meaning of the terms “machine” and “think”. The definitions might be
framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude
is dangerous. If the meaning of the words “machine” and “think” are to be found by
examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
meaning and the answer to the question, “Can machines think?” is to be sought in a
statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such
a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is
expressed in relatively unambiguous words.
(Turing then goes on the describe the Test: can a machine successfully imitate a human in
conversational give-and-take?)
Thus Turing explicitly states he is not offering a definition of thinking. He later refers
to “the polite convention that everyone thinks”, and suggests that we extend the same
convention to machines that pass the Test. It seems to me that Turing is, in effect, taking the
position that his Imitation Game is simply a prima facie test of intelligence, not a necessary
and sufficient condition. That is, it may be a reasonable practical guide, if we find ourselves
in need of making a decision on the matter, say for legal or other practical purposes, and in
the absence of contravening evidence. What might such evidence be (that, despite passing
the Test, a system is not intelligent)? One answer is obvious: the system turns out to have
an enormous database of answers to everything, and simply performs a lookup whenever
called upon to respond. This idea is one case of a program in which Searle [8] in the
Chinese Room scenario can rightly argue his point, for instance (although it was around
as folklore long before that). We would not regard such a system as intelligent: it does
no thinking, has no understanding, no true flexibility to deal with the unanticipated (since
everything has been anticipated for it in advance).4
But the Test does not tell us what intelligence really is—and Turing has distanced him-
self from that question. But then what good is his Test from a scientific perspective? As
Turing says at the very end: “We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty
there that needs to be done”. His Test provides a challenge that can be worked on. And
indeed some have taken up this challenge, e.g., contestants in the annual Loebner Prize
Contest. But what has the impact of the Test on AI really been? Yes, it is famous, but many
in AI have questioned it5 and it appears that few in the relevant subfield of natural-language
4 Presumably such a database would have to be large beyond any conceivable practicality, or even infinite, to
work as stated, and this supports the Test as a practical guide (i.e., how else could the system be designed to
actually work in real time and real space, except as one that does thinking-style processing), but that is another
issue.
5 See, for example, [4], for a particularly strong set of criticisms.
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such work is highly informed by studies in linguistics and developmental psychology and
even occasionally neuroscience.
5. Conscious experience
Hawkins suggests that ordinary consciousness is “what it feels like to have a neocortex”
(page 194) and also amounts to “forming declarative memories” (page 196). He does not
attempt to say how these two notions are related.6 He also mentions qualia, and states,
incorrectly, that this is a distinct kind of consciousness or a distinct issue or problem. I will
comment on all three of these.
The problem of qualia, or qualitative states, is not a separate problem, but is simply
a way of dramatizing the basic problem of (phenomenal, experiential) consciousness,
aka subjective awareness.7 That is, such states are characterized by having qualities, a
something-it-is-like to be in that state.8 It is like something to be awake; it is like some-
thing to dream; it is not like something to be in dreamless sleep, or to be dead, or to be a
rock. These things-it-is-like-to-be, these subjective qualities, these sentient feels of being
something, are the qualia. Some of them are color-qualia, or pain-qualia, but that is a detail,
not the real point of the so-called problem of qualia. Hawkins hits on it when he raises the
issue (page 198)—but then says no more about it—as to why there is any sort of qualia
sensation, any sort of subjective feeling, in the first place. That is the problem!9
Block [2] has described what he calls access consciousness, distinct from phenomenal
consciousness; the former seems close to Hawkins’ notion of declarative memories, and
does not require any form of experienced subjectivity: computers have access conscious-
ness of their memories. But phenomenal consciousness is precisely what philosophers tend
to call the problem of consciousness, what Chalmers [3] calls the hard problem: what is it
to be aware, to feel, to experience as a subject, to be something it-is-like-to-be. This hides
two questions: (i) what is it, in physical (or brain or neural or other terms) and (ii) why
is it so: what is it about that physical/brain/neural whatever-it-is, that makes it be aware,
a self, a something-to-itself, a subject, an experiencer? Of course, only when we answer
the second question will we be sure of the answer to the first. Nothing I can find in On
Intelligence even hints at an answer to either question.
Hawkins describes declarative memories as “memories you can recall and talk about”.
But surely any computer can form declarative memories in the sense of stores of data,
6 Presumably he would say a neocortex helps us form declarative memories, but that says nothing about why
there is any feel to it; nor does it address whether, say, chimpanzees—who presumably do not form declarative
memories, but who do have well-developed neocortices—are conscious or feel like anything (presumably they
do).
7 This is a fairly common understanding of the term “qualia”, although some prefer a more narrow usage. See
Searle [9] for a concurring opinion here.
8 This very helpful way of characterizing subjective consciousness is due to Thomas Nagel [6].
9 The literature on this is vast; my own attempt at an answer is given in [7]; roughly I urge the idea of a
primitive ur-quale on which all other qualia are based, and I situate the ur-quale in a rather strong condition of
self-representation.
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records and offer them up to a human. Not in English, to be sure, but why should that
matter? For that matter, some computer systems can even offer up reports in English, albeit
a limited form of English. The SNePS system, or its various applications known as CASSIE
[10,11], at the University at Buffalo, for instance, can report, in English, on what it has
been doing, when asked. But I have heard no one argue that CASSIE is conscious, nor do
I think Hawkins would so argue. It is, rather, that when we report on our doings, we are
doing more than retrievings and reportings. We are also experiencing our acts, we feel like
something as we engage in the conversation; and we also continue to feel like something
when the conversation has been long over—the retrieving and reporting is not what gives
us the sense of consciousness. Rather it is a matter of being aware, not in dreamless sleep;
it is like something to be so. Hawkins alludes to this but prefers his declarative memory
version without saying why, or how it differs from “awareness”. And why the forming of
the memory should be associated with consciousness is also not explained.
Hawkins gives a thought experiment here (pages 196–197). Suppose your memory of
playing a tennis game is erased afterward; he rightly claims that you would say it never
happened. Now if a videotape convinces you it did happen, you might then say you must
have been playing while unconscious (as Hawkins argues), or you might just as well say
that you have lost your memory of that time-period (a more likely result, as we all have
had memory-lapses, but few have had episodes of unconscious game-playing). In any case,
even accepting Hawkins’ version, his apparent conclusion that this shows the presence of
the memory is equivalent to having been conscious at the time, does not follow.10 Thus by
the very assumptions of the story, it would seem you were indeed conscious at the time
of the game, and just because later on you have a false belief about it does not change the
earlier fact of consciousness. Yes, of course, what you later say is that you had not been
conscious during the game, but you are mistaken. So all this shows is that, as with most
beliefs about what has transpired earlier, we can be mistaken about whether we had been
conscious at an earlier time. The memory was erased, but not the consciousness that had
occurred during the game—it is not that, later on, it is no longer true that you had been
conscious while playing.
So, the thought experiment seems to show the opposite of what Hawkins claims: the
presence of declarative memory is not the same as the fact of the consciousness: one can
be removed, while the other cannot. To be sure, one is not conscious now of having played
the game earlier, one is not conscious now of those (erased) memories. So, retention and
recall of those memories at a later time are what constitute consciousness of them at that
10 It is a little hard to be sure just what his claim is; he says (of your supposed assertion not to have been
conscious during the game) “Therefore this meaning of consciousness is not absolute. It can be changed after the
fact by memory erasure”. That claim seems false—the fact of the game-time consciousness seems given in the
description of the events—but he also says a few lines earlier “Your belief that you were conscious disappeared
only when your declarative memory was erased”. This latter seems correct enough. He might be saying that there
is no fact of the matter as to whether one is conscious, it is just a matter of what one is willing to say about it,
and that depends on what one remembers. But that raises two problems: (i) it suggests that there is nothing to be
explained here, which flies in the face of his own claims elsewhere that consciousness has a feel to it; and (ii) it
depends on your insisting you were not conscious, rather than saying you are not sure, or that you must have
forgotten.
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those events. Hawkins appears to conflate being in a conscious state with being conscious
of a particular memory. The record of having been conscious is gone, just as one’s record
of making a bank deposit might be lost, but that does not mean one was not conscious or
that no deposit was made, or that one is unconscious now.
There may be a one-way implication: consciousness may well require some sort of
memory formation—after all, consciousness surely involves some sort of processing of
(stored) information, hence of memories in some sense; but not the other way around:
memory-formation (even declarative ones) can occur without consciousness.11 Can a hu-
man utter apparently quite meaningful sentences—even ones that are true and that relate
past events—while utterly unconscious (e.g., while in dreamless sleep, or in a coma)?
Probably so; certainly computers can (not in dreamless sleep or a coma, but nevertheless
unconscious, since they are never conscious at all, so far).
6. Conclusions
A good many workers in AI will probably find themselves sharing—as I do—most of
Hawkins’ positive claims, e.g., the need to pay attention to human cognition and brain
function, the importance of a predictive world model learned from perceptual experience,
the need for general unifying theories. But his negative claim—that these have been ig-
nored by scientists—appears not to be as much on the mark, and he runs roughshod over
a bunch of complex issues. Nevertheless, his highly readable and engaging book, and his
prominence as a top-rate computer engineer/inventor, may help foster more public support
(especially in the form of more funding) for this important research direction.
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